“The roll of National Party MP’s to Waimakariri continues this month with Chris Tremain, Spokesman for Statistics and Associate Spokesman for Economic Development and Small Business coming to town on Monday 29 October says Kate Wilkinson.

A successful Hawkes Bay businessman before entering Parliament, Chris won the former Labour stronghold seat of Napier in 2005.

In his role as Small Business Liaison, Chris has been developing networking opportunities for small businesses and providing business owners with a forum for easy-to-understand advice through the "Small Business Cafe", which will roll out around New Zealand over the next two years.

Chris will speak at the Waimakariri National Party Electorate meeting, at 7.30pm at the Kaiapoi Co-operating Church, corner of Peraki and Fuller Streets, Kaiapoi.

“Hot on the heels of Anne Tolley’s visit last month, I’m delighted that Chris is able to venture south to attend our Electorate Meeting. The presence of National Party MP’s in Waimakariri over recent months has been strong and has been a great opportunity for constituents to meet our team.”

Posted by staff at 09:50

Justice Minister Mark Burton is so out of touch with the problems in legal aid that he’s advertising for more people to apply for it when there aren’t even enough lawyers to cope with existing workloads.

“He continues to believe there are no problems, saying things like ‘the total listed legal aid provider number has increased’ when all around him are saying otherwise.
 
“Even Justice Duffy disagrees with him, saying ‘the number of lawyers prepared to act for legally aided clients diminishes daily’.
 
“But Mark Burton ignores that and blithely continues on, organising radio and other advertisements calling for more legal aid applicants.

“When will he realise that this head-in-the-sand approach unfairly raises people’s expectations?”

Posted by staff at 09:43

8.07PM

 KATE WILKINSON (National): I rise to speak on the purpose of the Employment Relations
(Flexible Working Arrangements) Amendment Bill, which, as we know, is to provide a statutory right for employees to request a variation of their working arrangements. But it also places a duty on the employers who receive those requests. Can I say at this stage, as a bit of an introduction, that I think it is appropriate to say that what we are debating tonight really is an important issue-that of flexibility in the workplace. If we were debating only the importance of flexibility in the workplace then there would be no disagreement. That is not what we are debating; we are actually debating legislating for that flexibility. We do not need to debate the advantages both to employee and employer of flexibility in the workplace; because we know there are advantages. We applaud that and we support that flexibility. We recognise the importance of flexibility not just for women or parents but in order to facilitate good, productive employment relations for the benefit of both employee and employer. But we do not applaud or support unnecessary, rigid legislation. We support education as to the benefits of flexibility, but not the legislation.

 I refer to a previous Committee speech by the honourable member Mr Peter Brown. At that stage he admitted that all employees have the right now to ask for flexible working arrangements. That is what he said. He also said: "I do not think anyone is arguing that that it is not [true]." Obviously, that is right. But then when we asked why we even need this legislation his response was to refer to the purpose clause of the bill, which we are debating tonight, which includes an obligation on the employer to consider seriously a request for flexibility. Mr Brown said: *"The employee can already make a request, but under this bill the employer will have to consider it seriously.", as though under the current legislation the employer does not have to consider it seriously.

So what, exactly, does he think happens, or can happen, under the existing legislation? What does he think "good faith" means, if it does not include taking any reasonable request seriously?
[Interruption] I say to Mr Brown that is exactly what good faith means; it means taking any reasonable request seriously. In fact, the current legislation specifically provides for "good faith" applying in relation to a variation of working conditions; variations are provided for, good faith is provided for. Already the employer must act in good faith and consider such a request, so why do we even need this legislation? We say that it is not needed. We should have the debate, by all means. Debate is good; flexibility is good. We say use the debate to educate and promote the benefits of flexibility, but do not impose unnecessary legislation.

It was interesting, because Ms Fenton then said, in that prior reading: "There is a lot stopping people from asking for flexible working hours at the moment." Well, what exactly is stopping them asking, because it is certainly not in the law; it is already covered in existing legislation. But then what I liked was her example that in "understanding the realities of the working lives of many New Zealanders." That is what she said - "cleaners here in the House, here in Parliament, may want to clean the House during the day and not at night", and under the existing legislation they "would not have a prayer", but under this bill they would. Firstly, can I say they can make any reasonable request under the existing legislation. Secondly, all I can say is that I look forward to the interruption of a debate in the Chamber so the cleaners can clean, because they want to clean during the day.

We have heard, twice tonight, about the UK legislation, and that we should mimic the UK legislation, and that if it works over there, it will work here. I refer to the official advice we were given in the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee where we were cautioned on the use, and value, of such comparisons. I will quote the advice, because I want to get it exactly right: "There are questions as to the extent of the impact of the UK flexibility legislation because there are methodological inconsistencies in DTI-sponsored research on the impact. The DTI results are not necessarily supported by research from other organisations. There is no accurate pre-legislation baseline of information to measure from, and often the surveys do not distinguish between those eligible to request and those not eligible to request."

8.28PM

KATE WILKINSON (National): I rise to speak to clause 6A, which really is the substance of the Employment Relations (Flexible Working Arrangements) Amendment Bill. This is the clause that provides the employee with the statutory right to request a variation of working arrangements, and it also provides for the prescriptive statutory duty of the employer in relation to that request.

Before I continue, though, I would like to spend a little time on the Supplementary Order Paper 148* from the Minister Ruth Dyson, which omits the word "reasonably" from section *69AA(c). That might sound innocuous enough, but at the moment that clause provides that an employer may refuse a request "only if it cannot reasonably be accommodated on certain grounds." This Minister has said that an employer may refuse a request "only if it cannot be accommodated on certain grounds." There is a big difference between a request that cannot be accommodated and one that cannot be reasonably be accommodated. "Reasonably" brings in the notion of objectivity, which obviously that Minister is totally unaware of. By removing it, it virtually means that unless it is impossible for the employer to accommodate the request, the request must be granted.  By removing the word "reasonably" it takes away the objectivity, and the Minister should be aware of that. I think it is a very dangerous precedent to set in relation to that Supplementary Order Paper.

This is the real substance of the bill, and I know that we had said that we support flexibility, but we are concerned that, firstly, the legislation is not necessary, and, secondly, we are concerned about the cost to the employer. In fact, the New Zealand Herald editorial back in November was entitled "Don't turn flexibility into a cost." It is an interesting article and I would like to quote some excerpts from it, because I think it is very useful and adds to this debate. The article reads: "Flexibility, with reference to working arrangements, is a word long favoured by employers ... Previously, flexibility was advanced for the good of firms, industries and the whole economy; all of which needed to be as competitive as possible once they were exposed to global markets. Now flexibility is being argued on principles of 'work-life balance', particularly for working couples trying to meet the demands of children and a career. There is no reason that both interests cannot be served by mutually convenient working arrangements but mutual is the crucial word."

 This legislation is simply not necessary. The article continues: "But the more concrete proposals are those intended to help employees make requests for flexible terms, have their requests reasonably considered and arrangements adhered to. It suggests legislation could make more specific provisions for employees' rights to request flexible arrangements, the procedures employers must follow when they receive a request and the permissible grounds for a refusal.

If this begins to sound ominous for employers, it is." That is what the editorial says; I will repeat it: "If this begins to sound ominous for employers, it is." The article continues: "The principle needs restating that flexibility is best left to individuals and firms to find in their infinitely varying needs and circumstances. As soon as flexibility is codified, even as a negotiating procedure, it is in danger of becoming just another cost of employment and a discouragement to growth." Concerns have been expressed, and we will get practical here, that employers will have to prioritise the demands of parents and carers who qualify ahead of requests from other employees. Warnings have been given that this bill could also lead to personal grievances if employees feel that their demands for flexible working arrangements are not heeded.

Posted by staff at 08:32

Kate Wilkinson National MP is urging members of the public to sign a petition at her National Party stand at the Northern A&P Show at the Rangiora Showgrounds on Saturday 20 October, in order to join forces with local schools in urging Telecom to reconsider the proposed withdrawal of its  School Connection Programme.  

Schools have recently received a letter of condolence from Telecom, advising of their plans to halt what had proven to be a very successful supportive partnership between Telecom customers and local schools.  In response to this action, Kate Wilkinson wrote to all schools in the district and has received feedback from them, outlining their concerns with regard to how they will be affected.

The local National MP says, “My plan is to appeal on behalf of our community, and try and convince Telecom to reverse its decision to ‘pull the plug’ on the School Connection Programme.  This decision is a very disappointing one which will have significant implications for many schools in the Waimakariri district”.

The Telecom School Connection Programme has for many years offered customers the chance to accrue points for the school of their choice, based on the value of their Telecom account.  Over the course of the scheme, local schools have come to largely depend on the redeemable points, which they have used to help pay for things such as telecommunication charges, digital cameras and other ICT equipment, to help boost the quality of up to date facilities and services for their school.

Kate Wilkinson MP, who is strongly opposed to the closure of the Telecom scheme says “I am baffled by the making of a decision by Telecom that threatens to jeopardise a really positive and worthwhile relationship with our local school community.  I invite all members of the public to sign a petition at my stand at the Northern A&P Show at Rangiora Showgrounds this coming Saturday, so we can convince Telecom to reconsider its actions”.  Extra copies of her petition can be downloaded from www.kate.wilkinson.co.nz

Posted by staff at 09:40

KATE WILKINSON (National) : In rising to support the third reading of the Succession (Homicide) Bill, which is intended to codify the law that precludes a person who unlawfully kills another person from benefiting from the death of that person, I want to mention just a couple of cautions. I had mentioned these in the Committee stage of the bill and I would have to admit that they were brushed aside somewhat carelessly and indeed, in my mind, recklessly. My concern, as raised initially not only by me but by some of the submissions, concerns the fact that this bill does not take any account of differing degrees of moral culpability. The bill itself defines “homicide” as “the killing of a person … intentionally or recklessly by any means that would be an offence under New Zealand law, … but does not include (a) a killing caused by negligent act or omission; or (b) infanticide … or (c) a killing of a person by another in pursuance of a suicide pact; or (d) an assisted suicide”.

This code, this bill, has a degree of inflexibility. Bearing in mind that flexibility of laws must always be balanced with certainty, I note that with any inflexible law there is always the danger of unintended consequences of harsh and perhaps even unreasonable results. To illustrate this, I repeat some of the examples I gave in earlier addresses on the bill. There may be domestic killings that, on compassionate grounds, do not have the same moral abhorrence as a cold-blooded murder. A battered woman, abused over a long period of time, may suddenly snap and kill the abuser with whom she may have shared and owned a house. Under this bill, she would not inherit her share of that family house. Is it fair that she is treated exactly the same as a cold-blooded serial killer? Or is it fair that the judge be given discretion and, although not condoning such a situation, at least give some understanding and compassion to the issue? Why should the judge not be able to determine that in such a circumstance, extraordinary though it may be—and extraordinary it would have to be—the abused woman would be subject to punishment but would not also lose her family home, to which she would have been entitled?

In the case of a person convicted of failing to provide the necessities of life for some reason—again, in very extraordinary circumstances—is there any reason why a judge could not exercise a discretion if he or she finds that the moral culpability is at the lower end of the scale, and therefore enable any inheritance to stand?

My last example was that of the reckless driver. Let us suppose he has a car accident, recklessly but not necessarily negligently—recklessness has a higher threshold than negligence—and kills his loving wife. He is punished enough by losing his wife. He is punished enough by being convicted of recklessness. Does he really need to be punished again by being deprived of the ability to inherit his share of the family home—something his deceased wife would have wanted in any event? These situations could so easily have been provided for by inserting a simple proviso for the judge to have discretion in exceptional circumstances. That would not go so far as to condone any killing, because any killing, whatever the circumstances, should not be so condoned, but it would merely provide that, after taking into account all the evidence and all the circumstances, there may be exceptional enough circumstances whereby it is right that the killer should be able to inherit.

I raise these matters again now because when I raised them initially the answers I received came in two somewhat surprising versions. Firstly, we were told that “given the wide-ranging definition of homicide in the legislation, there is probably sufficient flexibility for a judge to do justice in individual cases with the flexibility afforded.” I do not agree that there is that much flexibility in the definition, and, more important, I am not convinced that it is usual for a judge to look first at the penalty and then decide the offence. That, I would have to suggest, is totally the wrong way round. The penalty should fit the crime, not the crime fit the penalty.

The other reason or justification that was suggested by the Government in earlier debates to my example of the reckless driver was that “Recklessness is included because it involves an element of intention.” Actually, no; it does not. Being reckless is not caring whether something happens. There is no intention component to recklessness. A reckless driver does not intend to kill. His actions are such that he is reckless whether or not death results. In fact, the Crimes Act definition of murder or culpable homicide is: “if the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is known by the offender to be likely to cause death, and is reckless whether death ensues or not:”. There is not an intention component to recklessness. In fact, if we look at the actual offence of reckless driving, we see that there is no intent to kill by driving. It is driving in a manner that is or might be dangerous but in which the driver gives no thought to whether it is dangerous. In other words, he is reckless as to the consequences, but there is not intent. So to exclude “recklessness” in the definition of homicide in this bill because someone erroneously thought recklessness involves intent is misguided at best, reckless at worst, but certainly careless as to the consequences.

The other issue I have with this bill is in relation to the burden of proof. Currently, for a person to be convicted of murder, the burden of proof is the criminal burden, namely “beyond reasonable doubt”. Yet under this bill, for the purposes of benefiting from the murderer’s estate, one need only to prove murder on the balance of probabilities—in other words, the civil burden of proof. I find that these mixtures of the burdens of proof are somewhat concerning, and we certainly have a similar issue with the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Bill. A murderer, for example, could be acquitted of murder on the basis of beyond reasonable doubt, but, for the purposes of this bill, could be deemed guilty on the balance of probabilities. I am not convinced that this is good law or good justice. On the lesser burden of proof, an innocent person could be deprived of his or her rightful inheritance.
On top of that, there is the issue of the time delays that it may take to even get the matter to court. We constantly hear of the court logjams, of median waiting times of 200, 300, or 400 days. For the administration of an estate to be delayed or deferred for a year or more may certainly be unconscionable and unreasonable and lead to harsh effects, especially in relation to the beneficiaries of that estate.

I will repeat what the New Zealand Law Society submitted on the bill, which was that the society “acknowledges the need for legislation to regulate the common law principle that precludes a killer from benefiting financially from the death of his or her victim” but it “opposes the proposed codification in its present form, because it takes insufficient account of differing degrees of moral culpability … it is concerned that an inflexible code will lead to harsh results in certain circumstances.” At this stage I point out that the code does differ from other approaches in the UK and in some Australian states, which do in fact give the courts a discretion to modify the rules except in cases where the moral culpability of the killer did not warrant the application of the rules. In other words, if the circumstances are extraordinary enough, then the judge has a suitable discretion.
So although we support the bill, there are still fishhooks in it. But the intent of the bill is right. A person should not benefit from his or her own unlawful action or from the death of the very person he or she is responsible for killing. The bill is supported.

Posted by staff at 09:55